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Abstract
Valuable 3D graphical models, such as high-resolution digital scans
of cultural heritage objects, may require protection to prevent piracy
or misuse, while still allowing for interactive display and manipu-
lation by a widespread audience. We have investigated techniques
for protecting 3D graphics content, and we have developed a re-
mote rendering system suitable for sharing archives of 3D mod-
els while protecting the 3D geometry from unauthorized extrac-
tion. The system consists of a 3D viewer client that includes low-
resolution versions of the 3D models, and a rendering server that
renders and returns images of high-resolution models according to
client requests. The server implements a number of defenses to
guard against 3D reconstruction attacks, such as monitoring and
limiting request streams, and slightly perturbing and distorting the
rendered images. We consider several possible types of reconstruc-
tion attacks on such a rendering server, and we examine how these
attacks can be defended against without excessively compromising
the interactive experience for non-malicious users.
CR Categories: I.3.2 [Computer Graphics]: Graphics Systems—
Remote systems
Keywords: security, 3D models, remote rendering, digital rights
management
1 Introduction
Protecting digital information from theft and misuse, a subset of the
digital rights management problem, has been the subject of much
research and many attempted practical solutions. Efforts to protect
software, databases, digital images, digital music files, and other
content are ubiquitous, and data security is a primary concern in
the design of modern computing systems and processes. However,
there have been few technological solutions to specifically protect
interactive 3D graphics content.
The demand for protecting 3D graphical models is significant. Con-
temporary 3D digitization technologies allow for the reliable and
efficient creation of accurate 3D models of many physical objects,
and a number of sizable archives of such objects have been created.
The Stanford Digital Michelangelo Project [Levoy et al. 2000], for
example, has created a high-resolution digital archive of 10 large
statues of Michelangelo, including the David. These statues rep-
resent the artistic patrimony of Italy’s cultural institutions, and the
contract with the Italian authorities permits the distribution of the
3D models only to established scholars for non-commercial use.
Though all parties involved would like the models to be widely
available for constructive purposes, were the digital 3D model of
the David to be distributed in an unprotected fashion, it would soon
be pirated, and simulated marble replicas would be manufactured
outside the provisions of the parties authorizing the creation of the
model.
Digital 3D archives of archaeological artifacts are another example
of 3D models often requiring piracy protection. Curators of such
artifact collections are increasingly turning to 3D digitization as a
way to preserve and widen scholarly usage of their holdings, by al-
lowing virtual display and object examination over the Internet, for
example. However, the owners and maintainers of the artifacts of-
ten desire to maintain strict control over the use of the 3D data and
to guard against theft. An example of such a collection is [Stan-
ford Digital Forma Urbis Project 2004], in which over one thousand
fragments of an ancient Roman map were digitized and are being
made available through a web-based database, providing that the
3D models can be adequately protected.
Other application areas such as entertainment and online commerce
may also require protection for 3D graphics content. 3D character
models developed for use in motion pictures are often repurposed
for widespread use in video games and promotional materials. Such
models represent valuable intellectual property, and solutions for
preventing their piracy from these interactive applications would be
very useful. In some cases, such as 3D body scans of high pro-
file actors, content developers may be reluctant to distribute the 3D
models without sufficient control over reuse. In the area of online
commerce, a number of Internet content developers have reported
an unwillingness of clients to pursue 3D graphics projects specif-
ically due to the lack of ability to prevent theft of the 3D content
[Ressler 2001].
Prior technical research in the area of intellectual property protec-
tions for 3D data has primarily concentrated on 3D digital water-
marking techniques. Over 30 papers in the last 7 years describe
steganographic approaches to embedding hidden information into
3D graphical models, with varying degrees of robustness to attacks
that seek to disable watermarks through alterations to the 3D shape
or data representation. Many of the most successful 3D water-
marking schemes are based on spread-spectrum frequency domain
transformations, which embed watermarks at multiple scales by in-
troducing controlled perturbations into the coordinates of the 3D
model vertices [Praun et al. 1999; Ohbuchi et al. 2002]. Comple-
mentary technologies search collections of 3D models and examine
them for the presence of digital watermarks, in an effort to detect
piracy.
We believe that for the digital representations of highly valuable
3D objects such as cultural heritage artifacts, it is not sufficient to
detect piracy after the fact; we must instead prevent it. The com-
puter industry has experimented with a number of techniques for
preventing unauthorized use and copying of computer software and
digital data. These techniques have included physical dongles, soft-
ware access keys, node-locked licensing schemes, copy prevention
software, program and data obfuscation, and encryption with em-
bedded keys. Most such schemes are either broken or bypassed by
determined attackers, and cause undue inconvenience and expense
for non-malicious users. High-profile data and software is particu-
larly susceptible to being quickly targeted by attackers.
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Fortunately, 3D graphics data differs from most other forms of dig-
ital media in that the presentation format, 2D images, is fundamen-
tally different from the underlying representation (3D geometry).
Usually, 3D graphics data is displayed as a projection onto a 2D
display device, resulting in tremendous information loss for single
views. This property supports an optimistic view that 3D graphics
systems can be designed that maintain usability and utility, while
not being as vulnerable to piracy as other types of digital content.
In this paper, we address the problem of preventing the piracy of 3D
models, while still allowing for their interactive display and manip-
ulation. Specifically, we attempt to provide a solution for maintain-
ers of large collections of high-resolution static 3D models, such as
the digitized cultural heritage artifacts described above. The meth-
ods we develop aim to protect both the geometric shape of the 3D
models, as well as their particular geometric representation, such
as the 3D mesh vertex coordinates, surface normals, and connectiv-
ity information. We accept that the coarse shape of visible objects
can be easily reproduced regardless of our protection efforts, so we
concentrate on defending the high-resolution geometric details of
3D models, which may have been most expensive to model or mea-
sure (perhaps requiring special access and advanced 3D digitizing
technology), and which are most valuable in exhibiting fidelity to
the original object.
In the following paper sections, we first examine the graphics
pipeline to identify its possible points of attack, and then propose
several possible techniques for protecting 3D graphics data from
such attacks. Our experimentation with these techniques led us to
conclude that remote rendering provides the best solution for pro-
tecting 3D graphical models, and we describe the design and imple-
mentation of a prototype system in Section 4. Section 5 describes
some types of reconstruction attacks against such a remote render-
ing system and the initial results of our efforts to guard against
them.
2 Possible Attacks in the Graphics Pipeline
Figure 1 shows a simple abstraction of the graphics pipeline for
purposes of identifying possible attacks to recover 3D geometry.
We note several places in the pipeline where attacks may occur:
3D model file reverse-engineering. Fig. 1(a). 3D graphics models
are typically distributed to users in data streams such as files in
common file formats. One approach to protecting the data is to
obfuscate or encrypt the data file. If the user has full access to the
data file, such encryptions can be reverse-engineered and broken,
and the 3D geometry data is then completely unprotected.
Tampering with the viewing application. Fig. 1(b). A 3D viewer
application is typically used to display the 3D model and allow for
its manipulation. Techniques such program tracing, memory dump-
ing, and code replacement are practiced by attackers to obtain ac-
cess to data in use by application programs.
Graphics driver tampering. Fig. 1(c). Because the 3D geometry
usually passes through the graphics driver software on its way to
the GPU, the driver is vulnerable to tampering. Attackers can re-
place graphics drivers with malicious or instrumented versions to
capture streams of 3D vertex data, for example. Such replacement
drivers are widely distributed for purposes of tracing and debugging
graphics programs.
Reconstruction from the framebuffer. Fig. 1(d). Because the
framebuffer holds the result of the rendered scene, its contents can
be used by sophisticated attackers to reconstruct the model ge-
ometry, using computer vision 3D reconstruction techniques. The
Figure 1: Abstracted graphics pipeline showing possible attack lo-
cations (a-e). These attacks are described in the text.
framebuffer contents may even include depth values for each pixel,
and attackers may have precise control over the rendering param-
eters used to create the scene (viewing and projection transforma-
tions, lighting, etc.). This potentially creates a perfect opportunity
for computer vision reconstruction, as the synthetic model data and
controlled parameters do not suffer from the noise, calibration, and
imprecision problems that make robust real world vision with real
sensors very difficult.
Reconstruction from the final image display. Fig. 1(e). Re-
gardless of whatever protections a graphics system can guarantee
throughout the pipeline, the rendered images finally displayed to
the user are accessible to attackers. Just as audio signals may be
recorded by external devices when sound is played through speak-
ers, the video signals or images displayed on a computer monitor
may be recorded with a variety of video devices. The images so
gathered may be used as input to computer vision reconstruction
attacks such as those possible when the attacker has access to the
framebuffer itself, though the images may be of degraded quality,
unless a perfect digital video signal (such as DVI) is available.
3 Techniques for Protecting 3D Graphics
In light of the possible attacks in the graphics pipeline as described
in the previous section, we have considered a number of approaches
for sharing and rendering protected 3D graphics.
Software-only rendering. A 3D graphics viewing system that does
not make use of hardware acceleration may be easier to protect from
the application programmer’s point of view. Displaying graphics
with a GPU can require transferring the graphics data in precisely
known and open formats, through a graphics driver and hardware
path that is often out of the programmer’s control. A custom 3D
viewing application with software rendering allows the 3D content
distributor to encrypt or obfuscate the data in a specific manner, all
the way through the graphics pipeline until display.
Hybrid hardware/software rendering. Hybrid hardware and soft-
ware rendering schemes can be used to take at least some advantage
of hardware accelerated rendering, while benefiting from software
rendering’s protections as described above. In one such scheme, a
small but critically important portion of a protected model’s geom-
etry (such as the nose of a face) is rendered in software, while the
rest of the model is rendered normally with the accelerated GPU
hardware. This technique serves as a deterrent to attackers tamper-
ing with the graphics drivers or hardware path, but the two-phase
drawing with readback of the color and depth buffers can incur a
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performance hit, and may require special treatment to avoid arti-
facts on the border of the composition of the two images.
In another hybrid rendering scheme, the 3D geometry is trans-
formed and per-vertex lighting computations are performed in soft-
ware. The depth values computed for each vertex are distorted in
a manner that still preserves the correct relative depth ordering,
while concealing the actual model geometry as much as possible.
The GPU is then used to complete rendering, performing rasteri-
zation, texturing, etc. Such a technique potentially keeps the 3D
vertex stream hidden from attackers, but the distortions of the depth
buffer values may impair certain graphics operations (fog compu-
tation, some shadow techniques), and the geometry may need to be
coarsely depth sorted so that Z-interpolation can still be performed
in a linear space.
Deformations of the geometry. Small deformations in large 2D
images displayed on the Internet are sometimes used as a defense
against image theft; zoomed higher resolution sub-images with
varying deformations cannot be captured and easily reassembled
into a whole. A similar idea can be used with 3D data: subtle 3D
deformations are applied to geometry before the vertices are passed
to the graphics driver. The deformations are chosen so as to vary
smoothly as the view of the model changes, and to prohibit recov-
ery of the original coordinates by averaging the deformations over
time. Even if an attacker is able to access the stream of 3D data af-
ter it is deformed, they will encounter great difficulty reconstructing
a high-resolution version of the whole model due to the distortions
that have been introduced.
Hardware decryption in the GPU.One sound approach to provid-
ing for protected 3D graphics is to encrypt the 3D model data with
public-key encryption at creation time, and then implement custom
GPUs that accept encrypted data, and perform on-chip decryption
and rendering. Additional system-level protections would need to
be implemented to prevent readback of framebuffer and other video
memory, and to place potential restrictions on the command stream
sent to the GPU, in order to prevent recovery of the 3D data.
Image-based rendering. Since our goal is to protect the 3D ge-
ometry of graphic models, one technique is to distribute the mod-
els using image-based representations, which do not explicitly in-
clude the complete geometry data. Examples of such represen-
tations include light fields and Lumigraphs [Levoy and Hanrahan
1996; Gortler et al. 1996], both of which are highly amenable to
interactive display.
Remote rendering. A final approach to secure 3D graphics is to
retain the 3D model data on a secure server, under the control of
the content owner, and pass only 2D rendered images of the models
back to client requests. Very low-resolution versions of the models,
for which piracy is not a concern, can be distributed with special
client programs to allow for interactive performance during ma-
nipulation of the 3D model. This method relies on good network
bandwidth between the client and server, and may require signifi-
cant server resources to do the rendering for all client requests, but
it is vulnerable primarily only to reconstruction attacks.
Discussion. We have experimented with several of the 3D model
protection approaches described above. For example, our first pro-
tected 3D model viewer was an encrypted version of the “QS-
plat” [Rusinkiewicz and Levoy 2000] point-based rendering sys-
tem, which omits geometric connectivity information. The 3D
model files were encrypted using a strong symmetric block cipher
scheme, and the decryption key was hidden in a heavily obfus-
cated 3D model viewer program, using modern program obfusca-
tion techniques [Collberg and Thomborson 2000]. Vertex data was
decrypted on demand during rendering, so that only a very small
portion of the decrypted model was ever in memory, and only soft-
ware rendering modes were used.
Unfortunately, systems such as this ultimately rely on “security
through obfuscation,” which is theoretically unsound from a com-
puter security point of view. Given enough time and resources, an
attacker will be able to discover the embedded encryption key or
otherwise reverse-engineer the protections on the 3D data. For this
reason, any of the 3D graphics protection techniques that make the
actual 3D data available to potential attackers in software can be
broken [Schneier 2000]. It is possible that future “trusted comput-
ing” platforms for general purpose computers will be available that
make software tampering difficult or impossible, but such systems
are not widely deployed today. Similarly, the idea of a GPU with
decryption capability has theoretical merit, but it will be some years
before such hardware is widely available for standard PC comput-
ing environments, if ever.
Thus, for providing practical, robust, anti-piracy protections for 3D
data, we gave strongest consideration to purely image-based rep-
resentations and to remote rendering. Distributing light fields at
the high resolutions necessary would involve huge, unwieldy file
sizes, would not allow for any geometric operations on the data
(such as surface measurements performed by archaeologists), and
would still give attackers unlimited access to the light field for pur-
poses of performing 3D reconstruction attacks using computer vi-
sion algorithms. For these reasons, we finally concluded that the
last technique, remote rendering, offers the best solution for pro-
tecting interactive 3D graphics content.
Remote rendering has been used before in networked environments
for 3D visualization, although we are not aware of a system specif-
ically designed to use remote rendering for purposes of security
and 3D content protection. Remote rendering systems have been
previously implemented to take advantage of off-site specialized
rendering capabilities not available in client systems, such as in-
tensive volume rendering [Engel et al. 2000], and researchers have
developed special algorithmic approaches to support efficient dis-
tribution of rendering loads and data transmission between render-
ing servers and clients [Levoy 1995; Yoon and Neumann 2000].
Remote rendering of 2D graphical content is common for Internet
services such as online map sites; only small portions of the whole
database are viewed by users at one time, and protection of the en-
tire 2D data corpus from theft via image harvesting may be a factor
in the design of these systems.
4 Remote Rendering System
To test our ideas for providing controlled, protected interactive ac-
cess to collections of 3D graphics models, we have implemented
a remote rendering system with a client-server architecture, as de-
scribed below.
4.1 Client Description
Users of our protected graphics system employ a specially-designed
3D viewing program to interactively view protected 3D con-
tent. This client program is implemented as an OpenGL and
wxWindows-based 3D viewer, with menus and GUI dialogs to con-
trol various viewing and networking parameters (Figure 2). The
client program includes very low-resolution, decimated versions of
the 3D models, which can be interactively rotated, zoomed, and re-
lit by the user in real-time. When the user stops manipulating the
low-resolution model, detected via a “mouse up” event, the client
program queries the remote rendering server via the network for a
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Figure 2: Screenshot of the client program.
high-resolution rendered image corresponding to the selected ren-
dering parameters. These parameters include the 3D model name,
viewpoint position and orientation, and lighting conditions. When
the server passes the rendered image back to the client program, it
replaces the low-resolution rendering seen by the user (Figure 3).
On computer networks with reasonably low latencies, the user thus
has the impression of manipulating a high-resolution version of
the model. In typical usage for cultural heritage artifacts, we use
models with approximately 10,000 polygons for the low resolution
version, whereas the server-side models often contain tens of mil-
lions polygons. Such low-resolution model complexities are of lit-
tle value to potential thieves, yet still provide enough clues for the
user to navigate. The client viewer could be further extended to
cache the most recent images returned from the server and projec-
tively texture map them onto the low-resolution model as long as
they remain valid during subsequent rotation and zooming actions.
4.2 Server Description
The remote rendering server receives rendering requests from
users’ client programs, renders corresponding images, and passes
them back to the clients. The rendering server is implemented as
a module running under the Apache 2.0 HTTP Server; as such,
the module communicates with client programs using the standard
HTTP protocol, and takes advantage of the wide variety of access
protection and monitoring tools built into Apache. The rendering
server module is based upon the FastCGI Apache module, and al-
lows for multiple rendering processes to be spread across any num-
ber of server hardware nodes.
As render requests are received from clients, the rendering server
checks their validity and dispatches the valid requests to a GPU for
OpenGL hardware-accelerated rendering. The rendered images are
read back from the framebuffer, compressed using JPEG compres-
sion, and returned to the client. If multiple requests from the same
client are pending (such as if the user rapidly changes views while
on a slow network), earlier requests are discarded, and only the
most recent is rendered. The server uses level-of-detail techniques
to speed the rendering of highly complex models, and lower level-
of-detail renderings can be used during times of high server load
to maintain high throughput rates. In practice, an individual server
node with a Pentium 4 CPU and an NVIDIA GeForce4 video card
can handle a maximum of 8 typical client requests per second; the
Figure 3: Client-side low resolution (left) and server-side high res-
olution (right) model renderings.
bottlenecks are in the rendering and readback (about 100 millisec-
onds), and in the JPEG compression (approximately 25 millisec-
onds). Incoming request sizes are about 700 bytes each, and the
images returned from our deployed servers average 30 kB per re-
quest.
4.3 Server Defenses
In Section 2, we enumerated several possible places in the graphics
pipeline that an attacker could steal 3D graphics data. The benefit of
using remote rendering is that it leaves only 3D reconstruction from
2D images in the framebuffer or display device as possible attacks.
General 3D reconstruction from images constitutes a very difficult
computer vision problem, as evidenced by the great amount of re-
search effort being expended to design and build robust computer
vision systems. However, synthetic 3D graphics renderings can be
particularly susceptible to reconstruction because the attacker may
be able to exactly specify the parameters used to create the images,
there is a low human cost to harvest a large number of images, and
synthetic images are potentially perfect, with no sensor noise or
miscalibration errors. Thus, it is still necessary to defend the remote
rendering system from reconstruction attacks; below, we describe a
number of such defenses that we have implemented in combination
for our server.
Session-based defenses. Client programs that access the remote
rendering system are uniquely identified during the course of a us-
age session. This allows the server to monitor and track the specific
sequence of rendering requests made by each client. Automatic
analysis of the server logs allows suspicious request streams to be
classified, such as an unusually high number of requests per unit
time, or a particular pattern of requests that is indicative of an im-
age harvesting program. High quality computer vision reconstruc-
tions often require a large number of images that densely sample
the space of possible views, so we are able to effectively identify
such access patterns and terminate service to those clients. We can
optionally require recurrent user authentication in order to further
deter some image harvesting attacks, although a coalition of users
mounting a low-rate distributed attack from multiple IP addresses
could still defeat such session-based defenses.
Obfuscation. Although we do not rely on obfuscation to protect the
3D model data, we do use obfuscation techniques on the client side
of the system to discourage and slow down certain attacks. The
low-resolution models that are distributed with the client viewer
program are encrypted using an RC4-variant stream cipher, and the
keys are embedded in the viewer and heavily obfuscated. The ren-
dering request messages sent from the client to the server are also
encrypted with heavily obfuscated keys. These encryptions simply
serve as another line of defense; even if they were broken, attackers
would still not be able to gain access to the high resolution 3D data
except through reconstruction from 2D images.
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Limitations on valid rendering requests. As a further defense,
we provide the capability in our client and remote server to con-
strain the viewing conditions. Some models may have particular
“stayout” regions defined that disallow certain viewing and light-
ing angles, thus keeping attackers from being able to reconstruct a
complete model. For the particular purpose of defending against the
enumeration attacks described in Section 5.1, we put restrictions on
the class of projection transformations allowed to be requested by
users (requiring a perspective projection with particular fixed field
of view and near and far planes), and we prevent viewpoints within
a small offset of the model surface.
Perturbations and distortions. Passive 3D computer vision recon-
structions of real-world objects from real-world images are usually
of relatively poor quality compared to the original object. This fail-
ure inspires the belief that we can protect our synthetically rendered
models from reconstruction by introducing into the images the same
types of obstacles known to plague vision algorithms. The partic-
ular perturbations and distortions that we use are described below;
we apply these defenses to the images only to the degree that they
do not distract the user viewing the models. Additionally, these de-
fenses are applied in a pseudorandomly generated manner for each
different rendering request, so that attackers cannot systematically
determine and reverse their effects, even if the specific form of the
defenses applied is known (such as if the source code for the ren-
dering server is available). Rendering requests with identical pa-
rameters are mapped to the same set of perturbations, in order to
deter attacks which attempt to defeat these defenses by averaging
multiple images obtained under the same viewing conditions.
• Perturbed viewing parameters We pseudorandomly intro-
duce subtle perturbations into the view transformation ma-
trix for the images rendered by the server; these perturbations
have the effect of slightly rotating, translating, scaling, and
shearing the model. The range of these distortions is bounded
such that no point in the rendered image is further than either
m object space units or n pixels from its corresponding point
in an unperturbed view. In practice, we generally set m pro-
portional to the size of the model’s geometry being protected,
and use values of n= 15 pixels, as experience has shown that
users can be distracted by larger shifts between consecutively
displayed images.
• Perturbed lighting parameters We pseudorandomly intro-
duce subtle perturbations into the lighting parameters used
to render the images; these perturbations include modifying
the lighting direction specified in the client request, as well
as addition of randomly changing secondary lighting to illu-
minate the model. Users are somewhat sensitive to shifts in
the overall scene intensity and shading, so the primary light
direction perturbations used are generally fairly small (maxi-
mum of 10◦ for typical models, which are rendered using the
OpenGL local lighting model).
• High-frequency noise added to the images We introduce
two types of high-frequency noise artifacts into the rendered
images. The first, JPEG artifacts, are a convenient result of
the compression scheme applied to the images returned from
the server. At high compression levels (we use a maximum
libjpeg quality factor of 50), the quantization of DCT coeffi-
cients used in JPEG compression creates “blocking” disconti-
nuities in the images, and adds noise in areas of sharp contrast.
These artifacts create problems for low-level computer vision
image processing algorithms, while the design of JPEG com-
pression specifically seeks to minimize the overall perceptual
loss of image quality for human users.
Additionally, we add pseudorandomly generated monochro-
matic Gaussian noise to the images, implemented efficiently
by blending noise textures during hardware rendering on the
server. The added noise defends against computer vision at-
tacks by making background segmentation more difficult, and
by breaking up the highly regular shading patterns of the syn-
thetic renderings. Interestingly, users are not generally dis-
tracted by the added noise, but have even commented that the
rendered models often appear “more realistic” with the high-
frequency variations caused by the noise. One drawback of
the added noise is that the increased entropy of the images can
result in significantly larger compressed file sizes; we address
this in part by primarily limiting the application of noise to the
non-background regions of the image via stenciled rendering.
• Low-frequency image distortions Just as real computer vi-
sion lens and sensor systems sometimes suffer from image
distortions due to miscalibration, we can effectively simulate
and extend these distortions in the rendering server. Sub-
tle non-linear radial distortions, pinching, and low-frequency
waves can be efficiently implemented with vertex shaders, or
with two-pass rendering of the image as a texture onto a non-
uniform mesh, accelerated with the “render to texture” capa-
bilities of modern graphics hardware.
Due to the variety of random perturbations and distortions that are
applied to the images returned from the rendering server, there is
a risk of distracting the user, as the rendered 3D model exhibits
changes from frame to frame, even when the user makes very mi-
nor adjustments to the view. However, we have found that the
brief switch to the lower resolution model in between display of the
high resolution perturbed images, inherent to our remote render-
ing scheme, very effectively masks these changes. This masking of
changes is attributed to the visual perception phenomenon known
as change blindness [Simons and Levin 1997], in which significant
changes occurring in full view are not noticed due to a brief dis-
ruption in visual continuity, such as a “flicker” introduced between
successive images.
5 Reconstruction Attacks
In this section we consider several classes of attacks, in which sets
of images may be gathered from our remote rendering server to
make 3D reconstructions of the model, and we analyze their effi-
cacy against the countermeasures we have implemented.
5.1 Enumeration Attacks
The rendering server responds to rendering requests from users
specifying the viewing conditions for the rendered images. This
ability for precise specification can be exploited by attackers, as
they can potentially explore the entire 3Dmodel space, using the re-
turned images to discover the location of the 3D model to any arbi-
trary precision. In practice, these attacks involve enumerating many
small cells in a voxel grid, and testing each such voxel to determine
intersection with the remote high-resolution model’s surface; thus
we term them enumeration attacks. Once this enumeration process
is complete, occupied cells of the voxel grid are exported as a point
cloud and then input to a surface reconstruction algorithm.
In the plane sweep enumeration attack, the view frustum is speci-
fied as a rectangular, one-voxel-thick “plane,” and is swept over the
model (Figure 4(a)). Each requested image represents one slice of
the model’s surface, and each pixel of each image corresponds to a
single voxel. A simple comparison of each image pixel against the
expected background color is performed to determine whether that
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(a) (b)
Figure 4: Enumeration Attacks: (a) the plane sweep enumeration
attack sweeps a one-voxel thick orthographic view frustum over
the model, (b) the near plane sweep enumeration attack sweeps the
viewpoint over the model, marking voxels where the model surface
is clipped by the near plane.
pixel is a model surface or background pixel. Sweeps from multiple
view angles (such as the six faces of the voxels) are done to catch
backfacing polygons that may not be visible from a particular angle.
These redundant multiple sweeps also allow the attacker to be lib-
eral about ignoring questionable background pixels that may occur,
such as if low-amplitude background noise or JPEG compression is
being used as a defense on the server.
Our experiments demonstrate that the remote model can be effi-
ciently reconstructed against a defenseless server using this attack
(Figure 5(b)). Perturbing viewing parameters can be an effective
defense against this attack; the maximum reconstruction resolution
will be limited by the maximum relative displacement that an in-
dividual model surface point undergoes. Figure 5(c) shows the re-
sults of a reconstruction attempt against a server pseudorandomly
perturbing the viewing direction by up to 0.3◦ in the returned im-
ages. Since plane sweep enumeration relies on the correspondence
between image pixels and voxels, image warps can also be effec-
tive as a defense. The large number of remote image requests re-
quired for plane sweep enumeration (O(n) requests for an n×n×n
voxel grid) and the unusual request parameters may look suspicious
and trigger the rendering server log analysis monitors. Plane sweep
enumeration attacks can be completely nullified by limiting user
control of the view frustum parameters, which we implement in our
system and use for valuable models.
Another enumeration attack, near plane sweep enumeration, in-
volves sweeping the viewpoint (and thus the near plane) over the
model, checking when the model surface is clipped by the near
plane and marking voxels when this happens (Figure 4(b)). The
attacker knows that the near plane has clipped the model when a
pixel previously containing the model surface begins to be classi-
fied as the background. In order to determine which voxel each
image pixel corresponds to, the attacker must know two related pa-
rameters: the distance between the viewpoint position and the near
plane, and the field of view.
These parameters can be easily discovered. The near plane dis-
tance can be determined by first obtaining the exact location of one
feature point on the model surface through triangulation of multi-
ple rendering requests and then moving the viewpoint slowly to-
ward that point on the model. When the near plane clips the feature
point, the distance between that point and the view position equals
the near plane distance. The horizontal and vertical field of view
angles can be obtained by moving the viewpoint slowly toward the
model surface, stopping when any surface point becomes clipped by
the near plane. The viewpoint is then moved a small amount per-
pendicular to its original direction of motion such that the clipped
point moves slightly relative to the view but stays on the new im-
age (near plane). Since the near plane distance has already been
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 5: 3D reconstruction results from enumeration attacks:
(a) original 3D model, (b) plane sweep attack against defenseless
server (6 passes, 3,168 total rendered images), (c) plane sweep at-
tack against 0.3◦ viewing direction perturbation defense (6 passes,
3,168 total rendered images), (d) near plane sweep attack against
defenseless server (6 passes, 7,952 total rendered images).
obtained, the field of view angle (horizontal or vertical depending
on direction of motion) can be obtained from the relative motion of
the clipped point across the image.
Because the near plane is usually small compared to the dimensions
of the model, many sweeps must be tiled in order to attain full cov-
erage. Sweeps must also be made in several directions to ensure
that all model faces are seen. Because this attack relies on seeing
the background to determine when the near plane has clipped a sur-
face, concave model geometries will present a problem for surface
detection. Although sweeps from multiple directions will help, this
problem is not completely avoidable. Figure 5(d) illustrates this
problem, showing a case in which six sweeps have not fully cap-
tured all the surface geometry.
Viewing parameter perturbations and image warps will nearly de-
stroy the effectiveness of near plane sweep enumeration attacks, as
they can make it very difficult to determine where the surface lies
and where it does not near silhouette edges (pixels near these edges
will change erratically between surface and background). The most
solid defense against this attack is to prevent views within a cer-
tain small offset of the model surface. This defense, which we use
in our system to protect valuable models, prevents the near plane
from ever clipping the model surface and thereby completely nulli-
fies this attack.
5.2 Shape-from-silhouette Attacks
Shape-from-silhouette [Slabaugh et al. 2001] is one well studied,
robust technique for extracting a 3D model from a set of images.
The method consists of segmenting the object pixels from the back-
ground in each image, then intersecting in space their resulting ex-
tended truncated silhouettes, and finally computing the surface of
the resulting shape. The main limitation of this technique is that
only a visual hull [Laurentini 1994] of the 3D shape can be recov-
ered; the line-concave parts of the model are beyond the capabilities
of the reconstruction. Thus, the effectiveness of this attack depends
on the specific geometric characteristics of the object; the high-
resolution 3D models that we target often have many concavities
that are difficult or impossible to fully recover using shape-from-
silhouette. However, this attack may also be of use to attackers
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Figure 6: The 160 viewpoints used to reconstruct the model with a
shape-from-silhouette attack; results are shown in Figure 7.
to obtain a coarse, low-resolution version of the model, if they are
unable to break through the obfuscation protections we use for the
low-resolution models distributed with the client.
To measure the potential of a shape-from-silhouette attack against
our protected graphics system, we have conducted reconstruction
experiments on a 3D model of the David as served via the render-
ing server, using a shape-from-silhouette implementation described
in [Tarini et al. 2002]. With all server defenses disabled, 160 im-
ages were harvested from a variety of viewpoints around the model
(Figure 6); these viewpoints were selected incrementally, with later
viewpoints chosen to refine the reconstruction accuracy as mea-
sured during the process. The resulting 3D reconstruction is shown
in Figure 7(b).
Several of the perturbation and distortion defenses implemented in
our server are effective against the shape-from-silhouette attack.
Results from experiments showing the reconstructed model qual-
ity with server defenses independently enabled are shown in Fig-
ures 7(c-g). Small perturbations in the viewing parameters were
particularly effective at decreasing the quality of the reconstructed
model, as would be expected; Niem [1997] performed an error anal-
ysis of silhouette-based modeling techniques and showed the linear
relationship between error in the estimation of the view position
and error in the resulting reconstruction. Perturbations in the im-
ages returned from the server, such as radial distortion and small
random shifts, were also effective. Combining the different pertur-
bation defenses, as they are implemented in our remote rendering
system, makes for further deterioration of the reconstructed model
quality (Figure 7(h)).
High frequency noise and JPEG defenses in the server images can
increase the difficulty of segmenting the object from the back-
ground. However, shape-from-silhouette software implementa-
tions with specially tuned image processing operations can take the
noise characteristics into account to help classify pixels accurately.
The intersection stage of shape-from-silhouette reconstruction al-
gorithms makes them innately robust with respect to background
pixels misclassified as foreground.
5.3 Stereo Correspondence-based Attacks
Stereo reconstruction is another well known 3D computer vision
technique. Stereo pairs of similarly neighborhooded pixels are de-
tected, and the position of the corresponding point on the 3D sur-
face is found via the intersection of epipolar lines. Of particular
relevance to our remote rendering system, Debevec et al. [1996]
showed that the reconstruction task can be made easier and more
accurate if an approximate low resolution model is available, by
warping the images over it before performing the stereo matching.
(a) E = 0 (b) E = 4.5 (c) E = 13.5 (d) E = 45.5
(e) E = 11.6 (f) E = 9.3 (g) E = 16.2 (h) E = 26.6
Figure 7: Performance of shape-from-silhouette reconstructions
against various server defenses. Error values (E) measure the mean
surface distance (mm) from the 5m tall original model. Top row:
(a) original model, (b) reconstruction from defenseless server, re-
construction with (c) 0.5◦ and (d) 2.0◦ perturbations of the view
direction. Bottom row: (e) reconstruction with a random image off-
set of 4 pixels, with (f) 1.2% and (g) 2.5% radial image distortion,
and (h) reconstruction against combined defenses (1.0◦ view per-
turbation, 2 pixel random offset, and 1.2% radial image distortion).
Ultimately, however, stereo correspondence techniques usually rely
on matching detailed, high-frequency features in order to yield
high-resolution reconstruction results. The smoothly shaded 3D
computer models generated by laser scanning that we share via our
remote rendering system thus present significant problems to basic
two-frame stereo matching algorithms. When we add in the server
defenses such as image-space high frequency noise, and slight per-
turbations in the viewing and lighting parameters, the stereo match-
ing task becomes even more ill-posed. Other stereo research such as
[Scharstein and Szeliski 2002] also reports great difficulty in stereo
reconstruction of noise-contaminated, low-texture synthetic scenes.
Were we to distribute 3D models with high resolution textures ap-
plied to their surfaces, stereo correspondence methods may be a
more effective attack.
5.4 Shape-from-shading Attacks
Shape-from-shading attacks represent another family of computer
vision techniques for reconstructing the shape of a 3D object (see
[Zhang et al. 1999] for a survey). The primary attack on our re-
mote rendering system that we consider in this class involves first
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(a) E = 0 (b) E = 1.9 (c) E = 1.0
(d) E = 1.1 (e) E = 1.7 (f) E = 2.0
Figure 8: Performance of shape-from-shading reconstruction at-
tacks. Error values (E) measure the mean surface distance (mm)
from the original model. Top row: (a) original model, (b) low-
resolution base mesh, (c) reconstruction from defenseless server.
Bottom row: reconstruction results against (d) high-frequency im-
age noise, (e) complicated lighting model (3 lights), and (f) viewing
angle perturbation (up to 1.0◦) defenses.
obtaining several images from the same viewpoint under varying,
known lighting conditions. Then, using photometric stereo meth-
ods, a normal is computed for each pixel by solving a system of
rendering equations. The resulting normal map can be registered
and applied to an available approximate 3D geometry, such as the
low-resolution model used by the client, or one obtained from an-
other reconstruction technique such as shape-from-silhouette.
This coarse normal-mapped model itself may be of value to some
attackers: when rendered it will show convincing 3D high fre-
quency details that can be shaded under new lighting conditions,
though with artifacts at silhouettes. However, the primary purpose
of our system is to protect the high-resolution 3D geometry, which
if stolen could be used maliciously for shape analysis or to create
replicas. Thus, a greater risk is posed if the normal map is integrated
by the attacker to compute a displacement map, and the results are
used to displace a refined version of the low-resolution model mesh.
Following this procedure with images harvested from a defenseless
remote rendering server and using a low-resolution client model,
we were able to successfully reconstruct a high-resolution 3D
model. The results shown in Figure 8(c) depict a reconstruction
of the David’s head produced from 200 1600x1114 pixel images
taken from 10 viewpoints, with 20 lighting positions used at each
viewpoint, assuming a known, single-illuminant OpenGL lighting
model and using a 10,000 polygon low-resolution model (Fig. 8(b))
of the whole statue.
Some of the rendering server defenses, such as adding high-
frequency noise to the images, can be compensated for by attack-
ers by simply adding enough input images to increase the robust-
ness of the photometric stereo solution step (although harvesting
too many images will eventually trigger the rendering server log
analysis monitors). Figure 8(d) shows the high quality reconstruc-
tion result possible when only random Gaussian noise is used as
a defense. More effective defenses against shape-from-shading at-
tacks include viewing and lighting perturbations and low-frequency
image distortions, which can make it difficult to precisely register
images onto the low-resolution model, and can disrupt the photo-
metric stereo solution step without a large number of aligned in-
put images. Figure 8(e) shows a diminished quality reconstruction
when the rendering server complicates the lighting model by us-
ing 3 perturbed light sources with a Phong component unknown to
the attacker, and Figure 8(f) shows the significant loss of geometric
detail in the reconstruction when the server randomly perturbs the
viewing direction by up to 1.0◦ (note that the reconstruction error
exceeds that of the starting base mesh).
The quality of the base mesh is an important determinant in the suc-
cess of this particular attack. For example, repeating the experiment
of Figure 8 with a more accurate base mesh of 30,000 polygons
yields results of E = 0.8, E = 0.6, and E = 0.7 for the conditions
of Figures 8(b), 8(c), and 8(e), respectively. This reliance on an
accurate low-resolution base mesh for the 3D model reconstruction
is a potential weak point of the attack; attackers may be deterred
by the effort required to reverse-engineer the protections guarding
the low-resolution model or to reconstruct an acceptable base mesh
from harvested images using another technique.
5.5 Discussion
Because we know of no single mechanism for guaranteeing the se-
curity of 3D content delivered through a rendering server, we have
instead taken a systems-based approach, implementing multiple de-
fenses and using them in combination. Moreover, we know of no
formalism for rigorously analyzing the security provided by our de-
fenses; the reconstruction attacks that we have empirically consid-
ered here are merely representative of the possible threats.
Of the reconstruction attacks we have experimented with so far, the
shape-from-shading approach has yielded the best results against
our defended rendering server. Enumeration attacks are easily
foiled when the user’s control over the viewpoint and view frus-
tum is constrained, pure shape-from-silhouette methods are limited
to reconstructing a visual hull, and two-frame stereo algorithms rely
on determining accurate correspondences which is difficult with the
synthetic, untextured models we are attempting to protect. Attack-
ers could improve the results of the shape-from-shading algorithm
against our perturbation defenses by explicitly modeling the distor-
tions and trying to take them into account in the optimization step,
or alternatively by attempting to align the images by interactively
establishing point to point correspondences or using an automatic
technique such as [Lensch et al. 2001].
Such procedures for explicitly modeling the server defenses, or cor-
recting for them via manual specification of correspondences, are
applicable to any style of reconstruction attempt. To combat these
attacks, we must rely on the combined discouraging effect of multi-
ple defenses running simultaneously, which increases the number of
degrees of freedom of perturbation to a level that would be difficult
and time-consuming to overcome. Some of our rendering server
defenses, such as the lighting model and non-linear image distor-
tions, can be increased arbitrarily in their complexity. Likewise, the
magnitude of server defense perturbations can be increased with a
corresponding decrease in the fidelity of the rendered images.
Ultimately, no fixed set of defenses is bulletproof against a so-
phisticated, malicious attacker with enough resources at their dis-
posal, and one is inevitably led to an “arms race” between attacks
and countermeasures such as we have implemented. As the ex-
pense required to overcome our remote rendering server defenses
becomes greater, determined attackers may instead turn to reaching
their piracy goals via non-reconstruction-based methods beyond the
scope of this paper, such as computer network intrusion or exploita-
tion of non-technical human factors.
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6 Results and Future Work
A prototype of our remote rendering system (ScanView, avail-
able at http://graphics.stanford.edu/software/scanview/ ) has been
deployed to share 3Dmodels from a major cultural heritage archive,
the Digital Michelangelo Project [Levoy et al. 2000], as well as
other collections of archaeological artifacts that require protected
usage. In the several months since becoming publically available,
more than 4,000 users have installed the client program on their per-
sonal computers and accessed the remote servers to view the pro-
tected 3D models. The users have included art students, art schol-
ars, art enthusiasts, and sculptors examining high-resolution art-
works, as well as archaeologists examining particular artifacts. Few
of these individuals would have qualified under the strict guidelines
required to obtain completely unrestricted access to the models, so
the protected remote rendering system has enabled large, entirely
new groups of users access to 3D graphical models for professional
study and enjoyment.
Reports from users of the system have been uniformly positive
and enthusiastic. Fetching high-resolution renderings over inter-
continental broadband Internet connections takes less than 2 sec-
onds of latency, while fast continental connections generally experi-
ence latencies dominated by the rendering server’s processing time
(around 150 ms). The rendering server architecture can scale up to
support an arbitrary number of requests per second by adding addi-
tional CPU and GPU nodes, and rendering servers can be installed
at distributed locations around the world to reduce intercontinental
latencies if desired.
Our log analysis defenses have detected multiple episodes of sys-
tem users attempting to harvest large sets of images from the server
for purposes of later 3D reconstruction attempts, though these inci-
dents were determined to be non-malicious. In general, the moni-
toring capabilities of a remote rendering server are useful for rea-
sons beyond just security, as the server logs provide complete ac-
counts of all usage of the 3D models in the archive, which can be
valuable information for archive managers to gauge popularity of
individual models and understand user interaction patterns.
Our plans for future work include further investigation of computer
vision techniques that address 3D reconstruction of synthetic data
under antagonistic conditions, and analysis of their efficacy against
the various rendering server defenses. More sophisticated exten-
sions to the basic vision approaches described above, such as multi-
view stereo algorithms, and robust hybrid vision algorithms which
combine the strengths of different reconstruction techniques, can
present difficult challenges to protecting the models. Another direc-
tion of research is to consider how to allow users a greater degree
of geometric analysis of the protected 3D models without further
exposing the data to theft; scholarly and professional users have
expressed interest in measuring distances and plotting profiles of
3D objects for analytical purposes beyond the simple 3D viewing
supported in the current system. Finally, we are continuing to in-
vestigate alternative approaches to protecting 3D graphics, design-
ing specialized systems which make data security a priority while
potentially sacrificing some general purpose computing platform
capabilities. The GPU decryption scheme described herein, for ex-
ample, is one such idea that may be appropriate for console devices
and other custom graphics systems.
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